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INTRODUCTION

In 1986, the American Law Institute (ALI) commissioned a study
in response to the crisis confronting the United States tort litigation/
liability insurance system. The project took more than five and
one-half years and was authored by prominent professors from the
nation's leading law schools. Advisers from academia as well as
members of both the judiciary and the practicing bar also made contributions. The resulting report, entitled Enterprise Responsibility
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foremost authority on tort matters." See Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d
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for PersonalInjury (Reporters' Study or Study),' focused on a wide

array of substantive and procedural issues in the law of torts. The
Reporters' Study was not subjected to the formal American Law
Institute approval process. Instead, the Study was made available by
the ALI for the bench, bar, and state legislators to use as a resource

to develop personal injury law.
The Reporters' recommendations on one topic, namely, punitive
damages, are particularly appropriate and timely. In response to perceived abuses and unfairness in punitive damages awards, "more and
more voices are calling for major overhauls of this area of the law. "2
Even the United States Supreme Court has expressed concern in recent years that punitive damages awards have "run wild." 3
Part I of this article will briefly discuss the Study's analysis of the
need for punitive damages reform. Part II will discuss the Study's
recommendations concerning reform of the standard by which punitive damages should be awarded. Part III will discuss the Study's
recommendations to set reasonable limits on the size of punitive
damages awards. Part IV will discuss the Study's recommendation
of a shield against tort damages, particularly punitive damages, for
products that comply with federal regulatory standards. Part V will
discuss the Reporters' proposal to deal with the special problem of
multiple, or repetitive, punitive damages awards.

1. See 2 AMERICAN LAW INST., REPORTERS' STUDY ON ENTERPRISE RESPONSIBILITY FOR PERSONAL INJURY: APPROACHES TO LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE (1991)

[hereinafter ALI STUDY].
2. Id. at 232. There have been two major systemic reanalyses of punitive damages
in the past several years. See ABA SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES, PUNITIVE DAMAGES: A CONSTRUCTIVE EXAMINATION (1986) [hereinafter ABA REPORT];
AMERICAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT ON PUNITIVE DAMAGES OF THE COMMITTEE ON SPECIAL PROBLEMS IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE (Mar. 3, 1989)

[hereinafter ACTL REPORT]. The Council on Competitiveness under President Bush also

recently made punitive damages reform a primary goal on its agenda. See PRESIDENT'S
COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS, AGENDA FOR CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM IN AMERICA
(1991) [hereinafter JUSTICE REFORM].

3. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1043 (1991). See also
Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 280-82 (1989)
(Brennan and Marshall, J.J., concurring) (O'Connor and Stevens, J.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part); Bankers Life & Casualty Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 87
(1988) (O'Connor and Scalia, J.J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment);
City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247, 270-71 (1981) (Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens, J.J., dissenting). See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Haslip May Alter Tort-Claim Strategies, THE NAT'L L.J., Feb. 17, 1992, at 23. As
this article went to press, the Court in TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp.,
419 S.E.2d 870 (W.Va.), cert. granted, 113 S. Ct. 594 (1992), agreed to hear arguments
in another case about the constitutionality of punitive damages. Exactly what the Court
will do is, of course, mere speculation, but the decision to hear the case is evidence of the
Justices' continuing concern about the frequency of excessive punitive damages awards.
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I. THE NEED FOR REFORM
After examining empirical evidence, the Reporters found that the
present system for awarding punitive damages has become more like

a state lottery than a system of justice." Little guidance is given to
juries, courts, and litigation parties as to how to decide whether and
when punitive damages should be awarded. Once a decision is made

to award punitive damages, juries again are not given substantive
guidance for deriving an appropriate amount to award.

Vagueness and uncertainty in punitive damages law undermines
confidence in the civil justice system and has a substantial and detri-

mental impact on American industry. For instance, the specter of
spiraling liability has sometimes discouraged manufacturers from de-

veloping and marketing new and useful products.6 Similar concerns
have also led to the withdrawal of some products from the market.'

The climate of uncertainty puts American business at a sizable disadvantage in its attempt to compete with foreign enterprise.' This is
4. According to the Study:
The pattern depicted by the empirical research appears to be that enterprises
are subject to an occasional risk of what may turn out to be a very large punitive award: an award that may be multiplied if a single business decision about,
say, a product design or warning leads to numerous successful tort claims, each
with its own punitive component.
ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 235.
5.

See PETER HUBER & ROBERT LITAN, THE LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF

LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION, 7 (1991) (reporting on American Medical

Association study finding that "[i]nnovative new products are not being developed or are
being withheld from the market because of liability concerns or inability to obtain adequate insurance"). See also WALTER OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION (1991); PETER
HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES (1988); Victor E.

Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, Issues in Tort Reform: National Childhood Vaccine
Injury Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future?,48 OmHo ST. L.J.
387 (1987); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt., Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257,
282 (1989) ("The threat of such enormous awards has a detrimental effect on the research and development of new products.") (O'Connor, J., and Scalia, J., concurring).
6. See Brown v. Superior Ct., 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 1064, 751 P.2d 470, 479 (1988)
(discussing withdrawal of Bendectin from the market after the price increased by more
than 300 percent and the withdrawal of all but two manufacturers of diphtheria-tetanuspertussis vaccine when the price increased a hundredfold from eleven cents per dose to
$11.40 per dose).
7. See S. REP. No. 215, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 9 (1991) ("American manufacturers
and product sellers generally pay product liability insurance rates that are 20 to 50 times
higher than those of foreign competitors. This disparity is attributable in large part to
the uncertainties and costs of the American tort litigation system."); H.R. REP. No. 748,
100th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 1, at 24 (1988) ("Without having to absorb the costs of prod-

uct liability exposure for most of their sales, foreign corporations have an obvious price
advantage. In Japan and Europe, product liability laws are more stable, litigation less
frequent, and large damage awards uncommon.").

particularly true in the area of innovation - where the United
States has traditionally been a leader." Because foreign manufacturers can innovate and develop products in a more "friendly" environment, they receive a competitive advantage over their American
counterparts. 9
To confront these problems, the Reporters' Study recommends
several specific reforms that judges and state legislators can incorporate into existing state procedures for the award of punitive
damages.
II.

STANDARDS FOR REFORM

The ALI Reporters, as discussed above, found serious flaws in the
present system for awarding punitive damages. In response, the
Study provides several recommendations to make clear the legal conditions in which punitive damages may be awarded. First, a standard
is established by which the trier of fact can evaluate whether an enterprise defendant should be liable for punitive damages. Second, the
Study recommends a burden of proof standard that a plaintiff must
meet to show that a defendant's conduct warrants the imposition of
punitive damages.
A. Proscribed Conduct
The Reporters' Study recommends a standard of "reckless disregard for the safety of others" as the appropriate standard for liability for punitive damages in enterprise cases.10 "Reckless disregard,"
the Study explains, "should involve both conscious advertence to the
risks in question. . . and gross deviation from the appropriate standard of care.""' The Study also cautions that juries must be "explicitly instructed" that manufacturers must engage in risk-utility
balancing. Additionally, juries must be told that their belief that the
defendant negligently struck the incorrect balance is insufficient to
subject the defendant to punitive, as opposed to compensatory,
damages. 12
8. See Man C. Maloo & Benjamin A. Neil, Products Liability Exposure: The
Sacrifice of American Innovation, 13 J. PROD. LIAB. 361 (1991).
9. In Japan and Europe contingency fees are prohibited and judges, not juries,
decide the amount of verdicts. Our competitors also have the advantage of a predictable
law. The United States patchwork of product liability laws stands in stark contrast to the
uniform approach taken by the European Community. See generally FIRST ANNUAL REPORT OF THE US.-JAPAN WORKING GROUP ON THE STRUCTURAL IMPEDIMENTS INITIATIVE (MAY 22, 1991) (comments of the Japanese delegation); Alfred W. Cortese, Jr. &

Kathleen L. Blaner, The Anti-Competitive Impact of U.S. Product Liability Laws: Are
Foreign Businesses Beating Us at Our Own Game?, 9 J.L. & Com. 167 (1989).
10. ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 248.
11. Id.
12. Id. In reviewing a case heard by the Alabama state courts, the United States
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The "reckless disregard" standard recommended by the Reporters
would not significantly increase the predictability of punitive damages liability. Courts and scholars have recognized that "recklessness" and "gross negligence" standards provide little guidance to
jurors because they cover "too broad and too vague an area of behavior. . .. "' Individuals and companies, therefore, are unable to
identify and avoid behavior that will trigger a punitive damages
award. The result is that the deterrent effect of punitive damages is
undermined. 4

A similar, but more precise standard, would require a plaintiff to
show that the defendant acted with "conscious, intentional indiffer-

ence to safety" as a predicate to punitive damages liability. 15 Practitioners who advocate punitive damages reform recommend precisely

this standard. 6 The United States Supreme Court supported this

Supreme Court stressed that the Alabama jury instructions at issue "enlightened the
jury" on the "nature and purpose" of punitive damages. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1044 (1991). These instructions could be easily drafted into
statutory form enabling a legislature to provide clear and unequivocal guidelines for the
jury to determine whether punitive damages should be awarded.
13. Tuttle v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353, 1360-61 (Me. 1985). See, e.g., OwensIllinois v. Zenobia, 601 A.2d 633, 651 (Md. 1992); Rawlings v. Apodaca, 726 P.2d 565,
577 (Ariz. 1986); Freeman v. Andersen, 651 S.W.2d 450, 452 (Ark. 1983); Jardel v.
Hughes, 523 A.2d 518, 527 (Del. 1987); Preston v. Murty, 512 N.E.2d 1174, 1175 (Ohio
1987); Lee v. Bank of America, 218 Cal. App. 3d 914, 920, 267 Cal. Rptr. 387, 390
(1990). See also David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in ProductsLiability Litigation, 74
MICH. L. REV. 1257, 1283 n.135 (1976) ("[A]ny definition of the punishable conduct,
such as . . . 'reckless' . . . disregard of the public safety will necessarily be quite
vague."). See PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES 128 (1988).
14. See David G. Owen, The Moral Foundationof Punitive Damages, 40 ALA. L.
REV. 705, 729 (1989); E. Donald Elliot, Why Punitive Damages Don't Deter Corporate
Misconduct Effectively, 40 ALA. L. REV. 1053, 1057-60, 1065 (1989); 2 LINDA L.
SCHLUETER & KENNETH R. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES 418-19 (2d ed. 1989).
15. An example of purely "intentional" wrongdoing would be an individual purposely firing a handgun at a specific person. In contrast, an example of "conscious"
wrongdoing would be an individual purposely firing a handgun into a crowd of people.
16. The American College of Trial Lawyers recommends that "[tihe appropriate
minimum standard for culpability for punitive awards . . . requires a conscious indifference to the safety of others." ACTL REPORT, supra note 2, at 10. The American Bar
Association recommends a standard of "conscious or deliberate disregard with respect to
the plaintiff." ABA REPORT, supra note 2, at 18. See also W. PAGE KEETON ET AL.,
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS, § 2 at 9-10 (5th ed. 1984) (punitive
damages require circumstances of outrage, such as a "conscious and deliberate disregard
of the interests of others").

standard in Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip.17 The Court emphasized that "[t]he trial court specifically found the conduct in
question 'evidenced intentional, malicious, gross, or oppressive
fraud.' "18 Importantly, a "conscious, intentional" standard would
establish the type of clear and strong trigger that juries and defendants need to promote deterrence and make punitive damages liability
consistent.
Sound public policy also suggests that punitive damages be reserved for cases of conscious, intentional wrongdoing. One must remember that in their origins, and at the time the Framers ratified
the Constitution, punitive damages were reserved solely for intentional torts, such as battery, assault, trespass, and false imprisonment.19 Punitive damages should not be awarded for less than this
type of egregious conduct. The compensatory tort system with its
ample awards, especially for pain and suffering, has developed mechanisms such as the collateral source rule2021 to deter wrongful conduct
that falls short of conscious wrongdoing.
B. Burden of Proof
The Reporters' Study recommends a "clear and convincing evidence" burden of proof standard to be applied in determining
whether punitive damages are warranted in civil tort cases.22 According to the Reporters, this burden of proof standard is proposed
17. 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991). See generally Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A. Behrens, Punitive Damages Reform--State Legislatures Can and Should Meet the Challenge Issued by the Supreme Court of the United States in Haslip, 42 AM. U. L. REv.
1365 (1993).
18. See Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1046.
19. See KEETON ET AL., supra note 16, at 9. See also Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 104750 (Scalia, J., concurring); James B. Sales, The Emergence of Punitive Damages in
Product Liability Actions: A FurtherAssault on the Citadel, 14 ST. MARY'S L.J. 351,
351 (1983); Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Magarian, Challenging the Constitutionality
of Punitive Damages:Putting Rules of Reason on an Unbounded Legal Remedy, 28 AM.
Bus. LJ.485, 485 (1990); Samuel Freifield, The Rationale of Punitive Damages, 1 OHio
ST. LJ. 5, 7 (1935); and David L. Walther & Thomas A. Plein, Punitive Damages: A
Critical Analysis: Kink v. Combs, 49 MARQ. L. REv. 369, 371 (1965).
20. The "collateral source rule" prohibits a defendant from reducing damages
based on benefits received by a plaintiff from outside, or collateral, sources such as insurance companies. See generally John G. Fleming, The Collateral Source Rule and Loss
Allocation in Tort Law, 54 CAL. L. REv. 1478 (1986).
21. See Note, Exemplary Damages in the Law of Torts, 70 HARv. L. REv. 517
(1957): "If an act is particularly wrongful, society imposes criminal sanctions in order to
deter the wrongdoer and others from repeating the offense. But while some faults, such
as ordinary negligence, should be discouraged, they do not warrant the stigma and severity of criminal punishment. Such deterrence is effected in tort law by shifting the
loss: the defendant is forced to repairthe harm done to the plaintiff." Id. at 523 (emphasis added).
22. ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 249.

[VOL 30: 263. 1993]

A Timely Call for Reform
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

because it will "signal clearly to juries that there is something special about a punitive award, and also give[s] judges somewhat

greater leverage in controlling the parties' allegations about, and the
jury's assessments of, such evidence before and during as well as af-

ter the trial."2

The clear and convincing evidence standard is the accepted trend

in the law of punitive damages. Each of the principal groups that
have analyzed the product liability system since 1979 has recom-

mended the clear and convincing evidence requirement.24 The American Bar Association recommended this standard in 1986 and the

American College of Trial Lawyers, an association of plaintiff and
defense attorneys who have substantial experience in litigation, fol-

lowed with their recommendation in 1989. Further, the United
States Supreme Court in Haslip noted: "There is much to be said in
favor of a State's requiring, as many do, . . . a standard of 'clear
and convincing evidence' or, even, 'beyond a reasonable doubt,'...

as in the criminal context." 25 Approximately half of the states have
undertaken this initiative either by legislative action2 6 or judicial

decision.27

23. Id. at 248.
24. See ABA REPORT, supra note 2, at 19; ACTL REPORT, supra note 2, at 15;
Uniform Product Liability Act, 44 Fed. Reg. 62714, 62748 (1979). See also Dorsey D.
Ellis, Jr., Punitive Damages, Due Process, and the Jury, 40 ALA. L. REV. 975, 994-95
(1989); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The ConstitutionalCasefor Reforming Punitive Damages
Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269, 298 (1983); David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing
Punitive Damages Against Manufacturersof Defective Products, 49 U. Cm. L. REV. 1,
58-59 (1982).
25. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1046 n.1 1. One state, Colorado, requires proof beyond a
reasonable doubt to support a punitive damages award. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25127(2) (1989).
26. See ALA. CODE § 6-11-20 (Supp. 1992); ALASKA Stat. § 09.17.020 (Supp.
1992); CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294(a) (West Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. § 51-12-5.1
(Michie Supp. 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-34-2 (Burns 1986); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 668A.1 (West 1987); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3701(c) (1991); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 411.184(2) (Michie/Bobbs-Merril 1991); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20 (West 1992);
Miss. H.B. 1270 § 2(1)(a) (signed by governor Feb. 18, 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 271-221 (5) (1991); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 42.005(1) (Michie 1991); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 32-03.2-11 (signed by governor Mar. 31, 1993); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(A)
(Anderson 1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9 (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925
(1991); S.C. CODE ANN. § 15-33-135 (Law. Co-op., Supp. 1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 21-1-4.1 (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-1 (1992). Colorado requires proof of
punitive damages liability "beyond a reasonable doubt." COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-25127(2) (1987).
27. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Armstrong, 442 N.E.2d 349 (Ind. 1982); Linthicum v. Nationwide Life Ins. Co., 723 P.2d 675 (Ariz. 1986); Masaki v. General Motors
Corp., 780 P.2d 566 (Haw. 1989); Tuttel v. Raymond, 494 A.2d 1353 (Me. 1985);
Wangen v. Ford Motor Co., 294 N.W.2d 437 (Wis. 1980); Owens-Illinois v. Zenobia,

Public policy makes clear that legislatures and courts should adopt

this middle burden of proof standard. First, the clear and convincing
standard signals to juries that they should be more certain of their
decision when they invoke punishment, as contrasted with awarding
compensatory damages. 8 Second, trial courts are alerted that some
cases may not be appropriate for hearing by a jury. 29 Finally, the
standard gives appellate courts power to carefully review decisions,
making sure that punitive damages are properly awarded.30
III. THE SIZE OF PUNITIVE AWARDS
The recommendations made by the Reporters' Study, as described
in the previous section, would rationalize and modestly tighten the
standards for punitive damages liability in approximately one-half of
the states. The Reporters were also concerned, however, about the
size of punitive damages awards31 and believed that some guidelines
should be adopted to control excessiveness in all of the states.32 In
response, the Study recommends several reforms governing the size
of punitive awards.
The Reporters' recommendations can be packaged into three categories: (1) recommendations that seek to limit prejudicial evidence
from and provide structure to trials involving punitive damages; (2)
recommendations to change the method by which punitive damages
awards are generally assessed; and (3) recommendations that seek
to establish meaningful procedures for review of punitive damages
awards.
601 A.2d 633 (Md. 1992); Hodges v. S.C. Toof and Co., 833 S.W.2d 896, 901 (Tenn.
1992).
28. See Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1064 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor
argues that a clear and convincing evidence standard should be required of states because
it would "signal to the jury that it should have a high level of confidence in its factual
findings before imposing punitive damages." Id.
29. Id. (a clear and convincing evidence standard would "permit closer scrutiny of
the evidence by trial judges and reviewing courts").
30. See id. (clear and convincing evidence standard would "constrain jury discretion"); See also Zenobia, 601 A.2d at 657; Masaki, 780 P.2d at 575. In Masaki, the
Supreme Court of Hawaii held:
[Plunitive damages are a form of punishment and can stigmatize the defendant
in much the same way as a criminal conviction. It is because of the penal
character of punitive damages that a standard of proof more akin to that required in criminal trials is appropriate, rather than the preponderance of the
evidence standard generally employed in trials of civil actions ....
A more
stringent standard of proof will assure that punitive damages are properly
awarded.
780 P.2d at 575.
31. See ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 252-53.
32. See id. at 253 ("we shall call for more searching reform of the criteria governing the size of punitive awards").
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A.

Recommendations as to Admissible Evidence and Trial
Structure

The Reporters were concerned about current trial practice in
many states that allows evidence of a defendant's wealth to be
paraded before a jury. This procedure prejudices defendants because
it improperly allows the jury to focus on the defendant's wealth,
rather than the allegedly wrongful conduct. The Reporters were also
concerned about the structure of many punitive damages trials. Current trial practice in many states allows jurors to hear issues relevant
only to the determination of punitive damages while assessing a defendant's liability for compensatory damages. To respond to these
concerns, the Study makes a couple of recommendations.
1.

The Defendant's Wealth

33
The Study recommends that, counter to popular practice, evidence of a defendant's total wealth should "no longer be admissible
in assessing punitive damages."3 4 The Study would, however, allow
reference to the profits earned by the defendant from the alleged
tortious activity at issue.
The Reporters offer several reasons why evidence of a defendant's
total assets is "irrelevant" in claims arising out of enterprise injuries.3 5 First, corporate wealth is typically spread among various corporate subsidiaries. Thus "it is often only an accident of the
corporate structure that places this wealth in the hands of the particular defendant entity."36 Second, evidence of a defendant's wealth

may unduly prejudice large corporate defendants, "which incur proportionately more instances of wrongdoing simply because of their
greater volume of business." 37 Third, imposing a burden of punitive
damages on a corporation punishes persons who often are not guilty
or wealthy, such as corporate employees, small shareholders, and
people who buy the company's products and may have to pay more
for them.38

See 1 JAMES D. GHIARDI & JOHN M. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES LAW AND
§ 5.36 & Table 5-3 (1985 & Supp. 1989); Kenneth S. Abraham & John C.
Jeffries, Punitive Damages and the Rule of Law: The Role of Defendant's Wealth, 18 J.
LEGAL STUD. 415, 415 n.1 (1989); Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in "Punitive"
Damages:Deterrence Measured Remedies, 40 ALA. L. REV. 831, 870 n.96 (1989).
34. ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 254-55.
35. See id. See also Dobbs, supra note 33, at 870-85.
36. ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 254.
37. Id. at 254-55.
38. Id. at 255. See also PETER W. HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION
33.

PRACTICE

The Reporters' recommendation to exclude evidence of a defendant's total wealth represents sound public policy. When a jury is allowed to focus on a defendant's wealth, the jury is free to disregard
what is really at issue in the case: whether and to what extent the
defendant's conduct was wrongful.39
2. Bifurcation of Punitive Damages Trials

Courts and legislatures that adopt the Reporters' Study's recommendation to allow reference to the profits earned by the defendant

from the particular alleged tortious activity should also permit the
defendant to bifurcate the trial.40 The use of a bifurcated trial procedure is recommended by the Reporters' Study.41 Bifurcation is equitable because it prevents the jury from hearing highly prejudicial
evidence of profits when determining basic liability. Information regarding profits is relevant only to determining the amount of puni-

tive damages to be awarded.42 Bifurcation also allows the jury to
easily separate the burden of proof that is required for compensatory
damages awards (i.e., proof by a preponderance of the evidence)
from that which the Reporters recommend for the award of punitive
damages (i.e., proof by clear and convincing evidence). 43 The American Bar Association 44 and the American College of Trial Lawyers
have endorsed this reform.45
AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

118 (1988) ("When assessed against a corporation, for example,

punitive damages are paid by stockholders, not by the responsible executives, and often
not even by the stockholders who owned the company when the original mistakes were
made.").
39. See Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1045 (1991) ("IT]he
factfinder must be guided by more than the defendant's net worth. Alabama plaintiffs do
not enjoy a windfall because they have the good fortune to have a defendant with a deep
pocket."). Alabama allows the defendant's wealth to be considered on appellate review,
but during trial the jury is precluded from considering the wealth of the defendant. The
Haslip opinion suggests that the jury's focus in determining punitive damages should be
on the defendant's active wrongdoing, not on his wealth. In finding that Alabama's procedure met due process standards, the Supreme Court in Haslip relied on the Alabama
trial court's decision to not allow the jury to consider the defendant's wealth.
40. Bifurcation requires the same jury, usually at the defendant's request, to determine subsequent to deciding liability for compensatory damages whether liability for punitive damages exists and, if liability does exist, the amount of punitive damages.
41. See ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 255 n.41.
42. See ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 264. A jury that is informed about a firm's
substantial profits from the product at issue in the case could be improperly influenced to
issue a favorable plaintiff's verdict even though the case is weak for finding liability.
43. See ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 255 n.41. See also Ellis, supra note 24, at
1003-07.
44. See ABA REPORT, supra note 2, at 19.
45. See ACTL REPORT, supra note 2, at 18-19. In the first common law decision
on this point by a state supreme court, the Tennessee Supreme Court recently held that
defendants may move for bifurcation in punitive damages cases. Hodges v. S.C. Toof &
Co., 833 S.W.2d 896 (Tenn. 1992). The Tennessee holding follows changes made in
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B. Recommendations About the Assessment of
Punitive Damages Awards

Another concern among the Reporters was that in almost all
states punitive damages are assessed by a jury verdict. According to

the Study, juries are often without adequate guidance as to how
large a punitive damages award is appropriate. In response to this

problem, the Study recommends that courts assess punitive damages
based on some ratio of the amount of compensatory damages previ-

ously awarded by the jury.
1. Assessment by the Court
The Study strongly recommends placing the responsibility for as-

sessing the amount of punitive awards on judges rather than juries.46
This reform, the Study explains, "is, after all, the standard followed

explicitly penal (as opposed to remedial) legal
in all other
' '4
regimes.

7

The Council on Competitiveness 48 under President Bush and the
Council on California Competitiveness 49 have recommended this reform. It is currently the law in some federal statutory causes of action,5 1 as well as the states of Connecticut, 5 Kansas

2

and Ohio. 53

several other states through court rules and legislation. See ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at
95, 101.
46. See ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 256. This reform has been supported by
commentators as well. See Griffin B. Bell & Perry E. Pearce, Punitive Damages and the
Tort System, 22 U. RICH. L. REV. I (1987); David G. Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1257 (1976); Malcolm E. Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 VA. L. REV. 269
(1983).
47. ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 256. See also Ellis, supra note 20, at 1003-07.
48. See JUSTICE REFORM, supra note 2.
49. See Council on California Competitiveness Report, California'sJobs And Future, 90 (April 23, 1992) (Peter V. Ueberroth, Chairman).
50. For federal statutes requiring judicial assessment of punitive damages, see Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, § 105(d)(2), 15 U.S.C. §2805(d)(2) (1988), and Fair
Credit Reporting Act, § 616, 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(2) (1988). For federal statutes requiring judges to determine the amount of any damages, see Equal Credit Opportunity Act,
§ 706, 15 U.S.C. § 1691e(b) (1988); Patent Act, July 19, 1952, ch. 950, 35 U.S.C.
§ 284 (1988); and Fair Housing Act, Title VIII, § 812, Civil Rights Act of 1968, 42
U.S.C. § 3612(c) (1988).
51. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240b (West Supp. 1990) (product liability
actions).
52. See KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3702 (1989).
53. See Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80(B) (Baldwin 1990).

Some critics have challenged judicial assessment of punitive damages as a violation of a defendant's right to jury trial under the Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitution. This criticism is
unlikely to hold up if asserted in court. In the past, defendants in
criminal cases have challenged judges' activity in sentencing as a violation of their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial.5 4 The Supreme Court, however, has held that no violation exists because
sentencing is not a determination of guilt or innocence.50 Rather,
sentencing involves consideration of many factors, including evidence
that might be inadmissible under the formal rules of evidence. Moreover, a criminal defendant's Sixth Amendment right to trial by jury
is given a broader scope than a civil defendant or plaintiffs right
under the Seventh Amendment. Thus, we believe that the recommendation is constitutional under the Seventh Amendment. 6 We
also believe that the Reporters' recommendation that courts set the
amount of punitive damages awards has a basis in sound public policy because judges are particularly suited to evaluate such material
in a dispassionate manner.
2. Ratio of Punitive to Compensatory Damages
The Reporters' Study also recommends that punitive damages
awards be limited to some ratio of compensatory damages. 57 Furthermore, the Study suggests that an alternative monetary ceiling
("perhaps $25,000") should be permitted for cases "in which the
plaintiffs harms were minimal, even though the defendant's behavior
54. See Spaziano v. Florida, 468 U.S. 447 (1984); Clemons v. Mississippi, 494
U.S. 738 (1990); Hildwin v. Florida, 490 U.S. 638 (1989); Cabana v. Bullock, 474 U.S.
376 (1986).
55. See cases cited supra note 54. Note especially the Court's reasoning in Spaziano: "The Sixth Amendment never has been thought to guarantee a right to a jury determination of [appropriate punishment to be imposed on an individual] ... " 468 U.S. at
459.
56. Several federal courts of appeals, including most recently the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals, have held that the Seventh Amendment does not prohibit judicial assessment of punitive damages at the trial or appellate level. See Shamblin's Ready-Mix
v. Eaton Corp., 873 F.2d 736 (4th Cir. 1989); Thomson v. Kerr-McGee Refining Corp.,
660 F.2d 1380 (10th Cir. 1981); Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 336 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1964).
The United States Supreme Court has approved of judicial assessment of discretionary
damages that serve a punitive purpose in civil penalty cases. See Tull v. United States,
481 U.S. 412 (1987). The Court has also implicitly upheld the practice in patent cases.
See Curtis v. Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 196 n.12 (1974). See generally Alan H. Scheiner,
Note, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, the Seventh Amendment, and the
Politics of Jury Power, 91 CoLum. L. REV. 142 (1991).
57. The Reporters Study does not recommend a specific ratio of punitive to compensatory damages that states should adopt. See ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 259 ("Our
concern in this Report is to endorse the substantive principle of the ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages, not to commit ourselves to specific judgments about each of the
issues in the operative formula.").
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was egregious.

58

The Reporters' Study's recommendation on this issue comports
with recent commentary from the courts. In Haslip, the United
States Supreme Court found a four-to-one ratio of punitive to compensatory damages to be "close to the line" of being unconstitutional. 9 The Supreme Court has made clear that this is an area
where states can do the most good in providing a reasonable and
rational safeguard against punitive damages awards that "run
wild." 60
Indeed, at least one state legislature"a and two state courts since
Haslip, including one state supreme court and one mid-level state
appellate court, have met the Supreme Court's challenge and focused their actions on the important relationship between punitive
and compensatory damages. In Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., the
Supreme Court of West Virginia stated: "Punitive damages should
bear a reasonable relationship to the potential of harm caused by the
defendant's action and that generally means that punitive damages
must bear a reasonable relationship to actual damages .... ,,"2 The
Maryland Court of Special Appeals, in Alexander & Alexander, Inc.
v. B. Dixon Evander & Associates, recently applied Haslip to invali-

date a punitive damages award. According to the court, the award

58. Id.
59. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S.Ct. 1032, 1046 (1991).
60. See id. at 1043. The Court has provided states with an opportunity to meet this
challenge in recent cases, vacating at least twelve decisions "in light of Haslip." See
Fleming Landfill, Inc. v. Garnes, 111 S. Ct. 2882 (1991); Transamerica Occidental Life
Ins. Co. v. Koire, 111 S. Ct. 2253 (1991); Southern Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Turner,
111 S. Ct. 1678 (1991); AMCA Int'l Fin. Co. v. Hilgedick, 111 S. Ct. 1614 (1991);
Intercontinental Life Ins. Co. v. Lindblom, 111 S. Ct. 1575 (1991); Clayton Brokerage
Co. v. Jordan, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991); Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Eichenseer, 111 S. Ct.
1298 (1991); Hospital Auth. of Gwinnett County v. Jones, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991);
Church of Scientology of Calif. v. Wollersheim, 111 S. Ct. 1298 (1991); International
Soc. for Krishna Consciousness of Calif. v. George, 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991); Pacific
Lighting Co. v. MGW, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 1299 (1991); Portec, Inc. v. The Post Office, 111
S. Ct. 1299 (1991).
61. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2-11(1)-(5) (signed by governor Mar. 31,
1993).
62. 413 S.E.2d 897, 908 (W. Va. 1991). In Games, the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia found an award of $105,000 punitive damages with nominal compensatory damages to be unconstitutional. Id. at 910.

was "all out of proportion to both the harm caused and the perniciousness of the conduct."63 The court found that the punitive damages award "surely crosse[d] th[e] line" set forth in Haslip.6 '
Similar to the Reporters' recommendation, but more detailed, the
American College of Trial Lawyers (ACTL) has recommended that
punitive damages should be limited to twice the amount of compensatory damages awarded, or $250,000, whichever is greater."" The
ACTL's recommendation is perhaps the best approach of the many
proposals advanced to place reasonable limits on punitive damages
awards.6 6 The ACTL's flexible approach keeps the law from being
an absolute prisoner of ratios and allows courts to do justice in the
unusual case in which a defendant's
conduct was egregious, but re67
sulted in little actual harm.
Note that when states act on the Reporters' Study and the
ACTL's recommendations, the statute must provide: (1) that the
jury should not be informed of the limit; and (2) if a jury's award
for punitive damages exceeds the limit, the award will be reduced by
the judge.6 8 The reason for these two provisions is that informing the
jury of the dollar limit may lead jurors to perceive that the ratio, or
the specific figure, is a guideline for assessing punitive damages. In
practical terms, the limit could become a floor for punitive damages,
rather than a ceiling.
63. 596 A.2d 687, 710, (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991), cert. denied, 605 A.2d 137
(Md. 1992).
64. Id. at 720, 596 A.2d at 711.
65. See ACTL REPORT, supra note 2, at 15. Some states have already adopted
similar limitations. See, e.g., NEV. REV. STAT. § 42.005 (1991) (limiting punitive damages awards to $300,000 in cases where compensatory damages are less than $100,000
and to three times the amount of compensatory damages in cases of $100,000 or more);
TEx. CiV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 41.007 (West Supp. 1992) (confining punitive
damages to four times actual damages, or $200,000, whichever is greater); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-03.2-11(4) (signed by governor Mar. 31, 1993) (limiting punitive damages to
twice compensatory damages, or $250,000, whichever is greater); Cf. CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 52-240a (West Supp. 1990) (punitive award may not exceed twice the compensatory
damages).
66. The American Bar Association has proposed a three-to-one ratio of punitive to
compensatory damages. See ABA REPORT, supra note 2, at 62. Cf. FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 768.73(1)(b) (West Supp. 1992) (punitive damages capped at three times compensatory damages unless "clear and convincing evidence" is presented by the plaintiff to show
that a higher award is not excessive). In a model punitive damages statute, President
Bush's Council on Competitiveness limited punitive damages to the amount of compensatory awards. See PRESIDENT'S COUNCIL ON COMPETITIVENESS REPORT, MODEL PUNITIVE
DAMAGES ACT (1991). See also COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(1)(a)(1987) (punitive
award may not exceed compensatory damages). Cf. OKLA. STAT. tit. 23, § 9 (1987) (punitive damages capped at compensatory damages awarded unless plaintiff establishes
case by clear and convincing evidence).
67. Sometimes this flexibility is needed. For example, if a person throws acid at
another, but only damages his clothing which is worth $250, it seems inappropriate to
limit punitive damages awards to $1,000. In such a case it may be appropriate to invoke
damages up to $250,000.
68. ACTL REPORT, supra note 2, at 15.

[VOL 30: 263, 1993]

A Timely Call for Reform
SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW

A.

Strict Post-Trial Review Procedures

The Reporters' Study additionally recommends establishing detailed post-trial standards for judicial review of punitive damages
awards. 69 According to the Reporters, "Such a list would give lawyers and juries somewhat clearer guidance at trial, and it would also
,,7o
strengthen the hand of judges in reviewing trial verdicts ....
This approach has already been endorsed by the American Bar
Association. 1
States that establish guidelines for post-trial review should consider the approach adopted by Alabama and approved by the United
States Supreme Court in Haslip. The Alabama Supreme Court had
in place post-trial procedures for scrutinizing and, where necessary,
overturning punitive awards. 72 As an additional check, the Alabama
Supreme Court provided a meaningful standard for appellate review
by undertaking both a comparative and substantive analysis to "insure that the [punitive] award does not 'exceed the amount that will

accomplish society's goals of punishment and deterrence.' ,,7' The
United States Supreme Court noted that this approach "insures that
punitive damage awards are not grossly out of proportion to the severity of the offense and have some understandable relationship to
69. ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 256.
70. Id.
71. See ABA REPORT, supra note 2, at 63-64 (listing seventeen possible factors
that courts should consider in reviewing jury awarded damages).
72. The Alabama Supreme Court set forth specific factors for the trial court to
consider and required trial courts to note in the record their reasons for sustaining a jury
verdict or setting it aside. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1044
(1991).
73. Id. at 1045. In a key footnote, the Court contrasted Alabama's detailed appellate guidelines with the punitive damages schemes of two other states about which "Justices expressed concern" in previous cases. See Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1045 n.10 ("In
those respective schemes, an amount awarded would be set aside or modified only if it
was 'manifestly and grossly excessive,' or would be considered excessive when 'it evinces
passion, bias and prejudice on the part of the jury so as to shock the conscience.' ")
(citations omitted). The Court's footnote suggests that states with open-ended appellate
review schemes may be vulnerable to constitutional attack on the ground that their review of punitive damage awards is vague and arbitrary, and therefore violates due process. Indeed, since Haslip, several courts have set aside state punitive damages review
standards analogous to those questioned in Haslip. See Mattison v. Dallas Carrier Corp.,
947 F.2d 95 (4th Cir. 1991) (setting aside South Carolina punitive damages scheme);
Gamble v. Stevenson, 406 S.E.2d 350 (S.C. 1991) (same); Johnson v. Hugo's Skateaway,
949 F.2d 1338 (4th Cir. 1991) (setting aside Virginia punitive damages procedure);
Games v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897 (W. Va. 1991) (West Virginia law;
same); Alexander & Alexander, Inc. v. B. Dixon Evander & Assocs., Inc., 596 A.2d 687
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1991), cert. denied, 605 A.2d 137 (Md. 1992) (Maryland law;
same).

compensatory damages. ' 74
IV. COMPLIANCE WITH REGULATORY STANDARDS DEFENSE
As described in Part I of this article, punitive damages have
caused a stifling effect on the development and marketing of some
new and useful products. Products have been taken off the market,
for example, because of the fear of punitive damages liability. The
Reporters' Study responds to these concerns by recommending that
states create a shield against tort damages, particularly punitive
damages. The shield would be appropriate in cases where the harmcausing aspect of a product complied with the requirements of a federal administrative regulation.
The Reporters endorsed this concept in no uncertain terms:
We believe that the risk of overdeterrence of socially valuable activities
through the imposition of tort liability on regulated products and activities
merits more widespread recognition of a regulatory compliance defense
....
The strongest case for a regulatory compliance defense arises when
punitive damages are sought. If a defendant has fully complied with a regulatory requirement and fully disclosed all material information relating to
risk and its control, it is hard to justify the jury's freedom to award punitive
damages.76

In this regard, the Study sets out four guidelines for courts and legislatures to follow to develop a compliance with regulatory standards
77
defense.
The public policy reason for this type of rule is clear: society
wants to encourage companies to invest and develop new and useful
products, especially in the area of medicine.7 8 The Study's recommendation would provide a strong incentive for the innovation of
74. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. at 1045.
75. ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 95.
76. Id. at 101.
77. The Study recommends the following four guidelines:
1. The regulation must have been promulgated by a specialized administrative
agency with the statutory responsibility to monitor risk-creating activities in
that domain and to establish and revise regularly specific standards governing
enterprise behavior;
2. The agency must have addressed the specific risk at issue in the case at
hand, and must have made an explicit judgment about what type of legal conditions are appropriate;
3. The enterprise in question must have complied with all the relevant standards prescribed by the agency; and
4. The defendant must have disclosed to the regulatory agency any material in
its possession (or of which it had good reason to be aware) concerning either
the hazards posed by the defendant's activities or the available means of controlling the related risks.
Id. at 110.
78. A recent study by the prestigious Brookings Institution points out the strong
need for the adoption of a compliance with regulatory standards defense, particularly
with regard to the pharmaceutical industry. See PErER HUBER & ROBERT LITAN, THE
LIABILITY MAZE: THE IMPACT OF LIABILITY LAW ON SAFETY AND INNOVATION

(1991).
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pharmaceuticals and medical devices. At the same time, the recom-

mendation calls for punishing manufacturers who withhold material
information from a federal government agency, such as the Federal
Food and Drug Administration. This approach would separate good
manufacturing practices from the bad - the dolphin from the
tuna. 9 Indeed, at least five states have enacted a defense against
punitive damages liability for drugs and medical devices approved by

the FDA."'
V.

MULTIPLE PUNITIVE AWARDS

The last major issue studied by the Reporters was multiple, or
repetitive, punitive damages awards. Mass torts pose a special problem in the law of punitive damages.81 Substantial punitive awards in
cases brought in mass enterprise injuries may strip a corporate defendant of its insurance coverage and assets.8 2 Such awards endanger the ability of later claimants to receive compensation for their
injuries.8 3 In response, the Reporters' Study recommends federal ac-

tion to "authorize mandatory class actions for multiple punitive
See also

PETER HUBER, LIABILITY: THE LEGAL REVOLUTION AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

(1988).
79. Note that in all of the controversial product liability medical device and drug
litigation, plaintiffs allege that the manufacturer wrongfully withheld material information from the FDA. See, e.g., Lee v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 721 F. Supp. 89 (D. Md.
1989); Bravman v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 984 F.2d 71 (2nd Cir. 1993).
80. See ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-701 (1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:58C-5(c)
(West 1987); OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.80 (Anderson 1991); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 30.927 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-18-12 (1992). Recently, the First and Fifth
Circuit Courts of Appeals recognized the strong public policy for the "compliance with
FDA standards" defense. Both circuits shielded a medical device manufacturer from any
liability for damages because the medical devices had been approved by the FDA before
the manufacturer marketed the device. See King v. Collagen Corp., 983 F.2d 1130 (1st
Cir. 1993); Stamps v. Collagen Corp., 984 F.2d 1416 (5th Cir. 1993).
81. See Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Magarian, Multiple Punitive Damage
Awards in Mass Disasterand Product Liability Litigation:An Assault on Due Process,
8 ADELPHIA L.J. 101 (1992); Dennis N. Jones et al., Multiple Punitive Damages Awards
for a Single Course of Wrongful Conduct: The Need for a National Policy to Protect
Due Process,43 ALA. L. REV. 1 (1991); John C. Jeffries, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L. REV. 139, 147 (1986).
, 82. See Lester Brickman, The Asbestos Litigation Crisis: Is There a Need for an
Administrative Alternative?, 13 CARDOZO L. REV. 1819, 1866-67 (1992); R. Barclay
Surrick, Punitive Damages and Asbestos Litigation in Pennsylvania: Punishment or Annihilation?, 87 DICK. L. REv. 265 (1983).
83. See ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 261 n.50. See also Roginsky v. RichardsonMerrell, Inc., 378 F.2d 382 (2d Cir. 1967) (criticizing application of punitive damages in
mass marketed product litigation); Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 727 F.2d 506
(5th Cir. 1984) (same).

damages arising out of large-scale mass torts. ' 84 The Study offers
two approaches. First, in mass disaster types of cases, such as airplane crashes, all claims could be consolidated in a federal court.
That court would have power to compel joinder by issuing injunctions against any related suits in any state or federal court. The federal court would also have the power to decide which state's
substantive law to apply and would produce a single punitive damage
award against the defendant for all members of the class.85 Second,
in cases involving mass exposure that occurs over years or decades,
such as in asbestos product liability cases, there would be greater
judicial discretion whether to consolidate such cases. The court's
principal focus would be on whether the number or cost of separate
actions threatens to deplete the defendant's assets.88
Other principal groups supporting tort law reform are calling for
similar federal action. A special committee of the American Bar Association that studied punitive damages proposed that Congress establish a process for creating a national class action for multiple
punitive damage claims arising out of conduct that results in similar
injuries.87 The American College of Trial Lawyers concluded that
the preferred approach would be a multi-district or national class
action requiring all litigants to appear in the same forum, with no
option to opt out.88
The difficulty with the Reporters' Study's, American Bar Association's, and American College of Trial Lawyers' proposals is that they
require burdensome and complicated procedural reforms, and impose
new or national choice-of-law rules. The proposals also fail to deal
with situations involving lower numbers, but potentially devastating
punitive damages claims (i.e., less than one hundred claims). Most
importantly, many situations exist in which common facts are insufficient to justify a class. This is particularly true when product liability actions do not involve a single incident mass tort (i.e., a plane
crash or hotel fire).89

84. ALI STUDY, supra note 1, at 260.
85. Id. at 412-19.
86. Id. at 419-21.
87. See ABA REPORT, supra note 2, at 78-81. Upon motion by a defendant and a
finding by a court that "there is a reasonable possibility that adequate compensatory
damages will not be available if punitive damages are not brought under control," there
would be a single mass trial in federal court on the punitive damages issue. Id. at 79. The
results of that trial would be binding on all class members. Id. at 81.
88. See ACTL REPORT, supra note 2, at 20-26.
89. The principal advantage of these proposals is that they would apportion punitive damages awards to all claimants. Policymakers considering a solution to the mass
tort problem, however, should not embrace these approaches - they contain the false
assumption that punitive damages serve as a "bonus" to compensatory damages, rather
than as a tool for punishment and deterrence.
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A better solution would focus on the social goals of punitive damages-punishment and deterrence. This solution could establish a
presumption that the first award of punitive damages imposed
against the defendant, for harm arising out of a single act or course
of conduct, is sufficient to punish the defendant and to deter others
from similar wrongful conduct in the future. Subsequent claimants
would be allowed, however, to overcome this presumption and pursue
additional punitive damages, but only by presenting new and substantial evidence of previously undiscovered conscious and deliberate
misconduct by the defendant. In this way, defendants and claimants
will be guarded against the counter-productive effects of repetitive
overpunishment. At the same time, society preserves a way to augment punishment if it is discovered that the original punishment was
based on inadequate information. This process could be most easily
established by federal law, but could also be carried out by the
courts themselves through the principle of comity.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The ALI Reporters' Study offers several recommendations to increase the consistency and predictability of punitive damages
awards. Generally, the recommendations are fair and reasonable.
Many of the Study's recommendations comport with the letter and
spirit of the United States Supreme Court decision in Haslip,9 0 and
many are supported by the other principal groups advocating punitive damages reform, including the American Bar Association and
the American College of Trial Lawyers. While we do not agree with
all of the Study's recommendations, we do believe they should be
given close attention by both legislators and the courts.

90. Pacific Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991).

